Your position from the first comment is free will and determinism both exist. I have never seen a reason to believe in free will. That is why we are at odds. I don’t know if I believe in determinism, but free will as most people use it is incompatible with dialectical materialism.
I stand behind my impression that “both” was intended to mean that diamat is ultimately compatiblist. A claim I disagree with, as I am not a compatiblist, yet I see no conflict between that and my dialectical materialist outlook.
What is what? I think my criticism is pretty plain and I’ve had to repeat it many times.
Your position from the first comment is free will and determinism both exist. I have never seen a reason to believe in free will. That is why we are at odds. I don’t know if I believe in determinism, but free will as most people use it is incompatible with dialectical materialism.
Are you sure about that?
Am I supposed to take “both” to not include “free will?”
You’re supposed to review your claim to see whether it’s accurate.
What claim do you want me to review?
The one I quoted
I stand behind my impression that “both” was intended to mean that diamat is ultimately compatiblist. A claim I disagree with, as I am not a compatiblist, yet I see no conflict between that and my dialectical materialist outlook.
Do you really not know what I’m challenging you on?