I think a sufficiently advanced intelligence could predict your or my behavior perfectly.

As far as we know, an infinitely advanced intelligence wouldn’t even be able to predict the weather a year from now, so I don’t think you’re right. Assuming of course that the brain is more complex than the weather.

Why is that a relatively sane framework? It’s a very anthropocentric worldview to just assume that.

I haven’t really encountered any serious framings of the world where a rock can experience joy, but I’d be very happy to know more if you know of any.

I guess ultimately it’s more of an empirical approach than an anthropomorphic assumption - nothing about the behaviour of a rock provides any evidence that it has any sort of awareness or consciousness. On the contrary, the available evidence seems rather consistent with the theory that it doesn’t.

The key difference between unpredictability and free will is the experience of free will, which is the opposite of what you say: my experience of free will is that I can predict my own behaviour quite well through my awareness of my own choices, but nobody else has access to that awareness, therefore they can’t predict my behaviour. I am predictable to myself, to an extent, but not to others. Unpredictability can be a consequence of free will, but it is not equal to free will.

With concepts like awareness and choice we of course have the same problem as when discussing consciousness - I can’t strictly speaking know if anything other than myself is conscious, since the main proof of consciousness is the subjective experience of said consciousness. Therefore I can’t strictly speaking say that the weather doesn’t have free will, in the same way that I can’t say a rock cannot experience joy.

But if we work in the relatively sane framework that rocks and weather do not have consciousness, and you and I do, then the experience of making a conscious choice is the central evidence for free will.

If it was proven that the world is deterministic, then I would consider that evidence irrelevant. But in a non-deterministic world, it becomes compelling.

Something can’t be determined if no one knows the answer.

Yes it can. The trajectory of the planets is well determined and can be predicted many years into the future. That was also true before astronomy, or before humans even. Even if nobody currently knows how to predict something, it can certainly be obeying deterministic rules.

Why do we assume determinism removes our free will? If I were a parent you could bet with almost certainty that I would take a bullet for my child, does that mean it’s not my choice because it’s predictable?

Under determinism there is no such thing as choice. Not whether you take a bullet for your child, not whether you watch TV or read a book, not whether you look at the wall for ten or twenty seconds. If there can be no choice, there can be no free will.

Why do we assume randomness gives or allows for free will?

The proposition is not than random behaviour is free will. The proposition is that since determinism precludes free will, the existence of free will must require a non-deterministic world. This does mean we know anything about how free will works or comes about, and certainly it doesn’t mean that non-determinism implies free will. We can definitely be living in a non-deterministic world without free will.

I disagree. What you mention is unpredictability, not free will. The weather is unpredictable, but hardly considered as having free will.

The important point is not whether you have free will to some observer, rather, the important point is whether you yourself have the experience of free will. Yes, that could be an illusion, but that is always a risk in empirical observation. It is awkward that you are the only one who can experience your free will, meaning it can’t be checked by external observers, but you can compare your experience of free will with others, and see that they have very similar experiences. If we try to be scientific about it, that could be considered evidence.

QM is consistent with an indeterministic physical world. That is indeed not the only interpretation, but it is a valid one. An indeterministic physical world is necessary for free will to be possible. Ergo QM allows for free will. It does not prove free will, but it breaks down a barrier for the existence of free will.

How does that relate to superdeterminism?

Indeed. But if superdeterminism (I assume it’s the same?) is true, and Monty Python’s Holy grail was filmed in a way to ensure that this experiment comes out non-local, then the scientific method is dead. That feels like cutting off your nose to spite your face, and sort of a paradoxical approach to science.

There are better “deterministic” alternatives out there like many worlds or pilot wave that doesn’t require you to reject the scientific method.

First of all, that’s not yet completely clear - we hardly have a complete accounting of all biological processes. But it is true that the processes we have accounted for so far are classical.

Second of all, quantum non-determinism still influences classical processes, especially chaotic ones where small shifts in initial conditions have a great effect on the long term outcome. See e.g. the weather, which is an entirely classical phenomenon, but where quantum fluctuations create a floor for how far into the future you can predict the weather even with perfect information and infinite computing power.

So quantum non-determinism allows for classical non-determinism.

It’s not that QM means we have free will. It’s that in a worldview where the mind is a purely physical concept, deterministic physics does not allow for free will. The introduction of non-determinism with QM does not imply free will, it allows for free will.

I think it’s “piques my interest”.

How does 117 compare to 1800? It looks lovely, and building diagonally is cool, but does it hold up?

From Wikipedia:

A contemporary article in The Homiletic Review called it an “impressive depiction of Christian faith and steadfastness” and described the two women to be in a “sisterly embrace”. A modern interpretation by Kobena Mercer named the work as an example of an interracial lesbian couple, likening it to Les Amis by Jules Robert Auguste.

From Wikipedia:

It depicts two sleeping nude women, one shackled, apparently intended as Christian martyrs sentenced to death by beasts.

The open beta was cool, worth having a look!

The read dead redemption comparison is so interesting. They would appear to be really similar, but AC is so much more fun to me than RDR. Especially RDR 2 is so serious, and I really miss the fun power fantasy of AC in traversal, mission structure, combat and so on.

Check out David Graeber’s book Debt - The First 5000 Years. He argues that waaay before money people lived in complex credit economies, and that money only happened when there was war, so that you could pay soldiers.

Also barter economies only happen when people who have been used to money don’t have access to money anymore. Didn’t happen before money, or at least there’s no evidence of it.

So a supercomputer is a physics experiment? A lithography machine for producing microchips is a physics experiment?

I guess a fair threshold would be “when it can be run and maintained by engineers rather than scientists”. In which case, many quantum computers are indeed physics experiments.

Fair enough - sounds more like a problem with the specific study than with the quantum computer

In a way, regular computers are also physics experiments. As are fridges and cars. When does an experiment graduate to being a technology?

No don’t

It’s not kind for sure, completely agree. My point was more that even if it’s unkind, it’s not necessarily racism or bioessentialism.

I think we must be kind to individuals, but still acknowledge problems with groups. That does require a shift in mindset to not feel personally impacted by statements about a group you belong to, which is easier said than done.