I read that in order to break the trace from the sender of my Monero to the recipient of my Monero, I need to make several transactions between my wallets, for example:

someone sent me 1 XMR --> my wallet 1 --> my wallet 2 --> recipient of my 1 XMR

(that i consider 1 additional transaction in aim to break the trace)

Can anyone explain so even layman understands chance/probability of breaking the trace when doing 0,1,2 such transactions between own wallets?

  • @hetzlemmingsworld@lemmings.worldOP
    3•23 days ago

    I assume that you mean to receive XMR on own wallet 1, wait for example one week, send to own wallet 2, wait a few days and then spend it (for example in an e-shop)?

    According to @jet@hackertalks.com jet@hackertalks.com suggestions, i assume that to improve this, i can split the first transaction between my wallets into two payments (hours or a day delay between each) and each sent to different wallet of mine, then making sure i do not send these two outputs later into same wallet of mine, which would compromise my anonymization attempt? Is this split into 2 payments doubling the difficulty to trace the payment?

    The method described in this whole post of mine can be considered very unlikely to be traced by any government in the next decade? Thank you

    • @azaltyEnglish
      2•21 days ago

      I would argue that splitting an input into 2 outputs that’ll both go in the same wallet and could be used together would severely harm your privacy and make tracing easier

      • jonycoo
        3•21 days ago

        @azalty @hetzlemmingsworld
        I have just a shallow understanding of XMR
        With one Input and two Output you would set two addresses of the anonymity set.
        With time correlation tecniques etc an attacker might be abel to infer traces.
        Also you cant use this combination, or any of these out keys again.
        Increasing the anonynity set makes a transaction stand out even more.